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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XXIII JUNE, 1954 NUIBER 2
JURIDIC ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATION I
JOSEPH F. COSTANZO, SJ.*
IN A trilogy of articles on Politeia,' we maintained that the two major
contributions of Catholicism to politics were the sound constitu-
tionalism of medieval provenance and representative governance as its
complimentary institutional safeguard. Ecclesiastical and royal rulers
constructed in the unison of a common faith, civilization, and culture
the unique historical phenomenon of Western Christendom upon a body
of doctrines which had evolved in unbroken sequence from patristic
literature and whose momentum made them the dominant force in
political thought down to at least the middle of the sixteenth century.
This Catholic heritage of ideas had fecundated the institutions of the
earlier middle ages, gave direction to feudal interdependence, and
gradually channelled the power of governance into definite organs of
political and juridical control. We cannot stress to strongly the effica-
cious influence of St. Augustine and St. Isidore-to mention only two-
during the centuries when the City of God was the favorite reading of
princes and the Etymologies and Sentences were the encyclopedias of
the political theorists. The christianization of the Merovingian dynasty,
the legislative achievements of the councils of Toledo, the Laws of the
Visigoths, and the Carolingian capitularia illustrate the concrete results
of the all-pervading influence on the social order. Slowly and surely,
in the unity of Faith, a Christian polity evolved with deepening roots
and expanding tradition. The central medieval doctrine' was the absolute
and imperishable value of the human personality in the image of its
divine Creator and its eternal transcendence and the correlative, the
inborn and indestructible rights of the individual. The formulation
and classification of such rights belonged to a later stage in the growth
of the theory of the natural law. Still, as a matter of principle, a recogni-
tion of their existence worked forcibly and immediately upon every
social and political experiment, and at the beginning of the thirteenth
* Professor of Political Philosophy and Constitutional Law at Georgetown Univer-
sity, Washington, D.C.
1. Cf. Graeco-Roman Politeia, 20 Ford. L. Rev. 119 (1951); Catholic Politela 1, 21
Ford. L. Rev. 91 (1952); Catholic Politeia II, 21 Ford. L. Rev. 236 (1952).
2. von Gierke, Political Theories of the Aliddle Ages 81-82 (Maitland's transL
Cambridge, 1900).
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century, when legal precision began to be stamped on a great number
of previously indefinite relations, the inviolability of the individual
worked for judicial processes to secure immunity from arbitrary action.
The juridical resultant of this ethico-legal fermentation was that consti-
tutionalism which Bracton so aptly summed up, sub Deo et lege, the
rule of law, divine and human. The political concomitant was the insti-
tutional development of representative governance to ensure the
supremacy of law in a government by the people as well as of and for
the people. Representative democracy better secures the supremacy of
law over the governors of the state and administrators of justice as
well as over its subject citizenry and holds both to accountability
equally and impartially.
Constitutionalism is at best a legal barrier, dictated by the metaphysics
of law and freely assumed, that is to say, it is a self-imposed limitation.
But so long as this definition has not been fixed in inviolable practices
-due processes, its survival and preservation will depend wholly upon
the goodwill and moral conscience of the governors and of the adminis-
trators of justice. It is not sufficient in the order of practice (though
necessary as a speculative and legal presupposition) to temper power
and its exercise with pacts and with all those prescriptive immunities
and privileges which constitute bills of rights. What is wanted is not
simply the elimination of the arbitrary factor in the concept of power.
Rather, institutions must be devised by which law would be sovereign,
rights respected, responsibilities of office accounted for, and the indi-
vidual able to vindicate his claims so that no one would be able to
assume arbitrary power without encountering a legal obstacle. The
act of violation, subversion, or defiance of a duly established order of
justice on the part of a public officer must be as obvious and obnoxious
to society as that of any private citizen. Macchiavelli pointed out
only too patently the consequences of politics that are embodied in
individuals and not in institutions.
The medieval christendom of the West did evolve just such institu-
tional means, albeit in rudimentary forms, which subsequent centuries
have confirmed to be the best human safeguard of constitutionalism
namely, representative government. Out of their rudimentary provi-
sions, the historical struggles for constitutional supremacy in Western
countries forged a political and legal maturity which by its inner logic
and historical continuity derives from the identical Christian principles
which were constantly immanent in the entire process. The Christian
solution was, truth to say, remarkably modern. For it provided the
answer to Austin's dilemma and resolved the specious antinomy implied
in Lord Acton's dictum. Austin's jurisprudence pivots the dilemma:
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either the king is sovereign or no; if he be sovereign then he is not
legally below the law, his obligation to obey the law is at most a moral
obligation; on the other hand if he is below the law, then he is not
sovereign, he is below some man or body of men who say what is the
law and they are sovereign.3 Centuries earlier, Bracton, Archdeacon
of Barnstaple and justice of the king, had formulated in part the
Christian response-sub Deo et lege. Supremacy of Human Law will
prevail if there is prior acknowledgment and submission to the Divine
Law, the law which is superior to those which are imposed by men.
In this manner, Austinian sovereignty, which is characteristically
personal command, is conditioned by an objective due order which is
to be discerned by reason and with which human governance must
accord. As an ordinatio rationis it invests the sovereign command with
the virtue of moral justice as well as with the compulsion of legal
justice. As we have noted, it was a partial answer because discretionary
and prudential actions may yet err in judgment or risk presumption.
Efficacious means must be devised to hold to accountability and review
the legal justice of these commands. When Lord Acton observed that
power tends to corruption, 4 we think he was expressing a scepticism
as to the reliability of all men in positions of power; and when he added
that absolute power corrupts absolutely, surely he expressed faith in the
soundness of the judgments of the generality of men. The second partial
answer, which complements the constitutionalism of Bracton, is that
accountability to men which, as we shall see in the course of the argu-
mentum of this article, obtains in representative governance.
But the problem is not so easily resolved. Modern history discloses
the failures of democratic representative governments of the 1930's to
be no less tragic than the collapse of the monarchical regimes which
preceded them and, if the virtues of one are no more durable and
efficacious than the other, there is no point in arguing for a preference
save perhaps for purely sociological considerations of adaptability. In
his Christmas Message of 1945, Pius XII urged for the first time in
the history of papal enunciations the preference of democratic rule
for Western nations as comporting with their political maturity and
as an assurance against the recrudescence of dictatorial discretionary
rule. Truth to say, the significant fact is that the democratic states
that disappeared after the 1920's were spurious democracies; their
peoples lacked the historical basis, and, indeed all real aptitude, for
representative government and democratic freedom. This is not to say,
however, that these spurious democracies were simply the impromptu
3. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 101 (London, 1920).
4. Lord Acton, The History of Freedom 16 (London, 1922).
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contrivances of Wilsonian romanticists imposed upon a people in the
disillusioning aftermath of a World War. Rather, they were degenera-
tions of a constitutionalism of medieval provenance which had been
severed from its historical roots and had lost its Christian inwardness
principally through the triple defection of "... heresy and unbelief,
Roman law, and heathen philosophy, .... We have intimated in
an earlier issue some of the reasons why representative government
survived in Protestant England and fell into desuetude in Catholic
countries of the Continent. The objectives of our present study are
to ascertain the historical and juridic origins of representative govern-
ment and, by identifying it in terms of its inward life to differentiate
it from specious claimants. We will maintain that the Anglo-American
system of representative governance was originally native to the English,
that is to say, it was not an alien import. It did not derive from the
Teutonic polity, as was staunchly argued by the Oxford historians of
the latter half of the nineteenth century, nor from the Roman polity.
Secondly, this English achievement is historically of Catholic origins,
of Catholic promotion, and must remain within its original Christian
tradition in order to preserve its vitality and viability. To this end,
we must, as we proceed, note the ideal and practical motives that inserted
themselves into the historical process and trace their lineage with
the past.
THE TEUTONIC POLITY IN ENGLAND
In the fifth volume of his monumental opus, the History of Political
Theory in the West, the eminent English historian, A. J. Carlyle, wrote:
"It is, indeed, a somewhat curious and even humorous thing to find, as we occasionally
do, persons who claim to be attached to the traditional aspects of political institu-
tions, criticising the representative system as though it were a modem thing, a product
of some crude political idealism of the nineteenth century, or discussing the merits
and demerits of a representative system upon merely abstract grounds. While all the
time the truth is that the representative system was not only created when the
civilization of the Middle Ages was at its highest point, but that it was also the
natural and logical outcome of its political conditions and ideas."O
Dr. Carlyle dismisses as somewhat curious and humorous the preten-
sions of the nineteenth century political idealists and the imaginative
postulates of the Romanticists because they are simply without historical
roots in human events. Nonetheless, he views rather sympathetically
the Teutonic polity theory which came in vogue at Oxford during the
later half of the nineteenth century without drawing the significant
5. Lally, As Lord Acton Says 55 (Newport, 1942).
6. 5 Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West 129 (London, 1928).
(Italics added).
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distinction between the heathen and Christian Teutonic societies as
well he must in order to accord with the above citation.
The fabrication and evolution of the Teutonic polity theory is a sorry
instance of the fusion of fancies, facts, and prejudices under the austere
guise of scientific research. What is remarkable is that it should gain
such wide credence as to dominate the historical literature of the
second half of the nineteenth century, and, in spite of its complete
discredit, still persists in the works of our own American historians on
the Anglo-American tradition of law and government. When we search
for its earliest assertion, we find that it is but a passing allusion in
Montesquieu's, The Spirit of the Laws:
"Whoever shall read the admirable treatise of Tacitus on the manners of the
Germans, will find that it is from them the English have borrowed the idea of their
political government. This beautiful system was invented first in the woods."7
This is the full context, uncritical and unsubstantiated. To see repre-
sentative government in the forests of Germany, as Mlontesquieu did,
is indeed a frightfully dangerous simplification of history. In effect,
this would explain civilization and institutional advance in terms of
primitive practices and the crudities of barbarians. Appearances deceived
Montesquieu;8 he merely glanced at the externals of representative
government. Rather, ought we to look into the embodied forms of
civilized society in order to ascertain what purposive motivations led it
out of barbarism. Montesquieu naively ascribed to pre-societal condi-
tions that which can only be the attribute of a matured body-politic.
Nonetheless, his reversal of the processes of history found warm climate
in the expanding Romanticism of the period which was to culminate
in the apocryphal state of nature of Jean Jacques Rousseau.
Montesquieu's statement was in accord with the Romanticists' motif
-and in its reaction against the scientific rationalism of the Age of
Enlightenment logically led the healthy animal kingdom of men to
political primitivism. When reason ceded to the exaltation of emotion
it is not surprising that the Teutonic polity theory should be out of
sorts with the historical science of the period. Nor were the romantic
idealists alarmed at this disjunctive dichotomy. But history has a
persistent way of betraying its perverters. Silence may be exploited in
the name of ignorance but facts are stubborn witnesses against the
reconstructing synthesis of the visionary. Seventeenth century England
7. Bk. XI, c. 6 (Dublin, 1751).
8. "The history of institutions is often a history of deception and illusions; for their
virtue depends on the ideas that produce and on the spirit that preserves them, and the
form may remain unaltered when the substance has passed away." Acton, op. cit. supra
note 4, at 2.
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was vibrant with the political controversies of the Stuart reign as to the
source and nature of original power. Yet we shall search in vain for
any evidence or even superficial reference to the Teutonic polity on
the part of the English Parliamentarians and of their traditional allies,
the English lawyers, in their appeal to historical precedent and English
law for a confutation of the absolutist pretensions of James I. During
the Civil War and at the trial of Charles I, neither the Rump Parliament
nor the Levellers amongst the military are aware of any tradition of
the primitive Teutonic community as the original sovereign. Surely a
more opportune time was never in greater need of such a theory of
constitutional history. But we find not even an intimation of it. How
then shall we account for the vogue of this theory and to what factors
shall we attribute its formulation and persistence against the actualities
of history?
The theory as eventually completed has been summarized as follows:
"Representative government is an outgrowth of the constitution of the primitive
Teutonic community, a community of freedom whose territorial domain was the
Mark-lands which were held both in severalty and in common. The assembly
of the Mark-men constituted the legislature which in its primitive form was
attended by all the freemen. This primitive Teutonic polity was the germ from
which constitutional government and representative institutions developed, with
results that have varied owing to historical accidents. The original polity found
a shelter in the forest cantons of Switzerland, in which it has been preserved to
our own times. In general, on the continent of Europe, it was extirpated by the
absolutist systems that arose out of feudalism. In England it was overlaid by
feudalism but not wholly destroyed, and its vitality was evinced by the growth of
parliamentary institutions. Representative government originated as a delegation
of the ancient right of personal attendance common to all freemen. . . . Thus
the original source of all existing models of constitutional government is the com-
munity of freemen embraced in the Teutonic Mark."9
The Teutonic origin of English representative government was com-
pounded by the English historians, Turner, Kemble, and Freeman,
in three successive contributions each modifying the prior. It began
with Turner's History of the Anglo-Saxons (1799-1805) and the en-
deavor to reconcile the apparent discrepancies between the charming
picture of primitive social conditions such as the Romanticists described
and the historians' crude portrait of the barbarians. Turner resolved
the artificial problem by a theory of an aboriginal culture in conformity
with Rousseau's interpretation of political history. A freedom-loving
Nomadic branch of the Anglo-Saxon tribes succeeded to preserve their
native characteristic habits of free communal association while the
others gradually lost their pristine liberties by submitting to the yoke
of civil institutions. To this supposition, he added the conjectural
9. Ford, Representative Government 49-50 (New York, 1924).
[Vol. 23
1954] JURIDIC ORIGINS OF REPRESENTATION I 129
beliefs that the Anglo-Saxon Witenagemot and the modern English
Parliament essentially resemble one another both in the manner of
selecting their representatives and-strange as it must seem to the
present-day political sociologist-in the possession and exercise of the
principle of no taxation without representation. Turner's account of
the Anglo-Saxon parliament is hardly more than a casual assemblage of
vassals summoned at the king's instance, and Turner himself frankly
admits he has adduced no historical evidence for the maturity he none-
theless persists to ascribe to their primitive political conventions. The
attractions of a preferred theory blur Turner's valuation of facts and
he reveals himself more of a Romanticist than a historian, still much
less a historian of the growth of institutions. John Mitchell Kemble
in his volume, The Saxons in England, sought to cure the weakness of
Turner's argument by supplementing the theory with the recent re-
searches of German scholars on the establishment of the Mark. This
they described as the self-governing community of Teutonic freemen.
Kemble could find no direct evidence of its existence amongst the
Anglo-Saxons and he accordingly argued by a ratiocination of "must
have been's" and suppositional inference for its transposition from
Germany to England, and its inherent evolution into the English
representative institutions. Though Kemble gave the Teutonic polity
theory an authoritative quality by a German borrowing which was
wanting in Turner yet the theory operated less as an hypothesis than
as a fixed principle of interpretation of facts. The strongest impetus to
the theory was provided by Professor E. A. Freeman. He strengthened
the argument for the continuity of Teutonic Anglo-Saxon polity simply
by eliminating the hazards which Turner's and Kemble's explanations
allowed. Turner had restricted the freedom-loving virtues to the nomadic
Teutonic tribe; Freeman made them a common Aryan possession.
Kemble had maintained, as some present day scholars still do, that
the original Celtic population largely survived the Saxon invasion and
in time shared in the rule of their conquerors; Freeman cleared the
land of all the Celts. By this dual elimination, the transposition of
the Mark to England is assured and its development into the English
representative institutions a matter of unquestionable deduction. What
historical record did not provide, logical inference from suppositional
premises deduced. What did it matter if there was no direct evidence
extant that the Mark ever existed in England, a fact Freeman himself
admitted. Freeman was an active proponent of the Teutonic polity
theory and in his visit to the United States from the autumn of 1881
to the spring of 1882 he lectured widely and repeatedly for its acceptance.
In his addresses at Johns Hopkins he advocated the study of American
local institutions in their relation to Teutonic origins. Surely, he argued,
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the transposition of English law and governance to American shores
involved the original inheritance of the Teutonic polity. Indices of his
influence are evident in the works of many of the American historians
such as John Fiske and our contemporary, George Burton Adams.
Thus did a mere allusion of Montesquieu fostered by the Romantic
movement gather strength by the abstractionist logic of those captivated
by theoretic prepossessions.
Freeman's epitome of the Teutonic origin of English representative
government did not go unchallenged. It was to be definitively under-
mined in its two vaunted arguments of the elimination of the Celts (or
their status and role as survivors) and the existence of the Mark and
its meaning. With these two props demolished, the original credits of
medieval Christian polity were reestablished on stronger foundations
than ever before. The opposition began with Thomas Wright's major
work, The Celt, the Roman, and the Saxon. He found that Anglo-Saxon
society was comprised of Celts and Roman descendants who worked
the fields and served their Saxon conquerors and rulers. There is no
evidence of a communal deliberative assembly-no mention at all is
made of the Mark-and whatever municipal gatherings occurred were
solely for the purpose of facilitating the payment of tribute. C. H.
Pearson's volume on England during the Early and Middle Ages re-
affirmed the survival of the Celts notwithstanding the successive Teutonic
invasions and discredited the conjectural reasonings as to the trans-
position of free self-governing communities by the conquering invaders.
On the contrary, the invaders introduced rather rude conditions of
graded servitude. Elton's Origins of English History added strength
to Wright's and Pearson's portrayal of the Teutonic contribution. The
Saxon lords and their attendants did not extend personal liberty to the
conquered but rather reduced them to subjection, socially and politically.
However, the ulterior position as to the existence of the Mark amongst
the Teutons themselves in Germanic lands and their significance as
free self-governing communities had not yet been invalidated. So far
the survival of the Celts had been vindicated and this position was
corroborated by the researches of ethnologists; and the denial made
that the Teutons had ever transposed representative governance from
Germanic to English soil.
A decisive blow was to be struck at the roots of the Mark theory
from an unsuspecting quarter-by a French historian and economist.
German scholarship had accumulated evidence that established the
Mark as the self-governing community characteristic of Teutonic free-
men. That granted, the continuity of that native polity was assumed
(in default of contrary historical evidences) when the Saxons imposed
their governance on English soil. The extermination of the Celts
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reassured such an assumption; their survival made it less certain but
still highly probable. In the April 1889 issue of the Revue des Questions
Historiques, Fustel De Coulanges published a lengthy essay wherein
he scrutinized the evidence adduced for the Mark theory. He con-
cluded that ethnologically the Mark connoted for the Teutons the
terminal boundaries of private property and only in a secondary sense
dignified the property itself. In no way did it mean an intermediary
agency representative of the community nor was there any extraneous
evidence for such an ascription. The obvious deduction was disastrous
for the English proponents of the Teutonic origins of English repre-
sentative institutions; for the Mark, "in the sense called for by the
theory, had not existed among the Teutonic tribes," and consequently
the confident presumption of its continuity in the Saxon conquest of
England proved to be a baseless optimism. Subsequent research by
Sir Paul Vinogradoff, F. Seebohm, and H. Munro Chadwick disclosed
that the Teutonic plant bore a different fruit. At the time of the invasion
the constitution of the Germanic society was autocratic and it trans-
mitted to English soil not personal liberty but a harsh servitude. The
casual assemblies which Turner, Kemble, and Freeman mistook (as
did Montesquieu) for representative parliaments were scarcely more
than a gathering of the king's personal attendants or, as Bishop Stubbs
described them, "mere retainers of the nobles." It was not till the
Norman Conquest that this imposed servitude upon which Saxon aris-
tocracy rested was tempered and modified by Continental feudalism.
It is accordingly not without righteous indignation that Lord Acton
pronounced the theory which asserted liberty to be the aboriginal
property of savages "an invention of men without fastidiousness in
their political tastes."'-0 The theory that traced the free institutions of
Europe and America, and elsewhere, to the life that was led by the
Teutonic tribes, he described as one of the desperate enterprises of
historical science. Professor Maitland has expressed himself just as
unequivocally on the suppositional inference about primitive institutions
in England:
"We do well to remember that the oldest laws that we have, however barbarous
they may seem, are none the less Christian laws.... This is well to remember,
for it should prevent any glib talk about primitive institutions: Teutonic law
(for what is true of England is true also of the continent) when it is first set in
writing has already ceased to be primitive; it is already Christian, and so dose
is the connection between law and religion, that we may well believe that it has
already undergone a great change.""
10. Lally, op. cit. supra note 5, at 136.
11. Maitland, The Constitutional History of England 2 (London, 1920).
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ROMAN POLITY IN ENGLAND
There is much less question as to the enduring influence of the
Roman occupation. On the Continent, Roman law once knitted together
the Roman Empire and even survived its downfall for at least two
centuries; but in England it failed to take root.
"Roman legal institutions do not appear to have survived the abandonment of
Britain by the Romans; at least they do not appear to have contributed materially
to the formation of the laws of the pre-Norman period of English history. 'We
speak of law,' declares Maitland, 'and within the sphere of law everything that
is Roman or Romanized can be accounted for by later importation. . . . And,
in point of fact, there is no trace of the laws and jurisprudence of imperial Rome,
as distinct from the precepts and traditions of the Roman Church, in the earliest
Anglo-Saxon documents. Whatever is Roman in them is ecclesiastical. . . . This
inroad of the Roman ecclesiastical tradition, in other words, of the system which
in the course of time was organized as the Canon Law, was the first and by no
means the least important of the Roman invasions, if we may so call them, of our
Germanic polity.' 12
Thus far we have discounted the unfounded pretensions of the Teutonic
origin of English Constitutional and Institutional history. It simply
isn't an historical actuality. Romanism is doubly non-relevant. It did
not survive the Saxon conquests and what is obviously more to the
point, it is in the very essence of its polity incompatible with English
constitutionalism. The English development is then neither Teutonic
nor Roman. The maturity it attains is distinctly an English achieve-
ment. The contributory factors, religious, ecclesiastical and civil, were
those of Western Christendom. The English heritage is the logical
result of the historical process common to all the nations of medieval
Europe. The exigencies of logic then require that we ask whether the
Romanism inherent in the Justinian renascence of the eleventh century
disturbed or became part of the Christian tradition that had evolved
since St. Augustine and St. Isidore. Arnold Toynbee has focused for
us the true measure of the Justinian revival within the comprehen-
sive perspective of the sociological-political civilization of Western
Christendom.
"It is true that, after the interregnum and the Dark Age, the Justinian Corpus
Juris was, so to speak, rediscovered-in Orthodox Christendom in the tenth century
and in Western Christendom in the eleventh-and this discovery undoubtedly
produced a profound effect thereafter upon legal thought and practice in both
these societies. This, however, was in the nature of a legal 'renaissance'; and,
in making a comparison between Justinian's and Benedict's legislative work, it
is perhaps more pertinent to bear in mind that, whereas Benedict's Rule was a
new kind of legislation which broke new ground, and, in breaking it, fulfilled an
urgent need, Justinian was codifying a law which was not merely old, but was on
12. Hazeltine, Roman and Canon Law in the Middle Ages, 5 Cambridge Medieval
History 756 (Cambridge, 1934).
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the verge of becoming an anachronism owing to the disappearance of the social
conditions which the Roman Law had been designed to meet. For fully three
centuries after the Justinian codification was completed, this code was altogether
inapplicable to the new social conditions that supervened upon the final bankruptcy
of the Hellenic culture. And, in view of this, Justinian's work may fairly be called
'labour lost'.' 3
In conclusion, then, the English representative system is neither
derived from nor in any way indebted to the Teutonic polity theory
hot only for want of valid historical credentials but also for the marked
antithesis between the two polities. As for Roman legal institutions,
they do not appear to have survived the withdrawal of the imperial
troops. The Roman laws that are in evidence from the earliest Anglo-
Saxon documents are the ecclesiastical laws of the new Rome, the
canon law of the Catholic Church. Nor is there any palpable evidence
that the rediscovery of Justinianism in the eleventh century influenced
to any enduring measure the legal and institutional development of
Western Christendom. We need scarcely advert, as an aside, that there
is no question of the influence of ancient Greek polity on medieval
development. The Politics of Aristotle, which gave medieval thought
direct contact with Greek political ideas, was unknown in Western
Europe before the second half of the thirteenth century and the Renais-
sance had yet to dawn.
Some modern historians have a disdainful way of misconstruing the
virtues of medieval civilization. While respectfully admiring its achieve-
ments in the reconstruction of a pax christiana out of the chaos of
barbarian disruption, they fear to admit such accomplishments as
they would reserve only to modern invention. Possibly their reluctance
to admit the indebtedness of our most advanced political and juridical
institutions to medieval christendom is motivated by the Comtian
formula for progress. Professor McIlwain, for instance, will maintain
that constitutionalism is but a product of Roman law revival and the
Protestant disruption of the unity of Christendom, which, if preserved
intact, would have promoted and fostered political autocracy. The
distinguished Carlyle brothers, on the contrary, maintain "... that the
representative system was not only created when the civilization of the
Middle Ages was at its highest point, but that it was also the natural
and logical outcome of its political conditions and ideas."'1 4 These
conditions and ideas were universally uniform in the West. 1. . . the
political civilization of Western Europe in the Middle Ages was homo-
13. 3 Toynbee, A Study of History 266 (London, 1935). For the failure of the Roman
Reception in England at the time of the Renaissance confer Maitland's admirable Rede
lecture given at Cambridge in 1901, English Law and the Renaissance.
14. 5 Carlyle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 129.
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geneous, that, whatever may have been the cause of the later divergence
of the political organization of England from that of the Continental
countries, the medieval political systems were in their origin similar-
we would almost say identical-and the ideas or principles they embodied
were the same." 5
Three observations are to be made: first, the representative system
reached its most advanced stage of development in England while it
suffered indifferent fortunes on the Continent; second, the develop-
ment of representative principles and methods took place in Spain
even earlier than in England and the Spanish Cortes of Leon and
Castile provided tried precedents for the English; third, the nature and
extent of this development in the thirteenth century did not belong to
any one western country, but was rather the common product of the
common elements of medieval political civilization. The rise of the
representative system was the intelligible and logical development of
the fundamental principles of the political civilization of the pax
christiana. This development, the Carlyles repeatedly insist, ". . . was
not an accidental or isolated phenomenon, due to conditions peculiar
to England or to any other country, but rather represents the opera-
tion of forces and tendencies which belonged to the whole of Central
and Western Europe."' 6 The need in the thirteenth century of an
organization of national determination and resources more effective
than the feudal system could furnish activated certain Christian prin-
ciples, particularly, the principle of equality and consent to the develop-
ment of some new organization which should relate the king to the
whole body of his subjects, and which should make his governance
effective and legitimate because it was founded upon the counsel and
consent of the community as a whole.
Prior to a scrutiny of the Christian history of representative govern-
ment we should review the pre-Christian practices of viceregency in
order the better to ascertain the distinct virtues of the former and their
inward essence. We will observe that essential differences derive first
from the Christian doctrine of equality and its correlative of consent as
applied by St. Augustine to the juridical order; second, from the
Christian notion of prudential judgment as formulated through the
maior and sanior pars principle of Canon law; and third, the Christian
interpolation (by the Papacy) of the private Roman law maxim, quod
omnes tangit ab omnibus approbetur, also differentiates it from its
pagan antecedents. These three constitute the Christian ethico-theo-
logical foundations by which the representative government is elevated
above the empirical level of administrative expediency.
15. 6 Carlyle, A History of Medieval Political Theory in the West 90 (London, 1938).
16. 5 Carlyle, op. cit. supra note 6, at 139.
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REPRESENTATION IN THE PRE-CHmsTIN ERA
The idea of vicarious action is elementary and so fundamental that
it has a history as ancient as the multiple cares of man when these
exceeded either the competency or opportunities of one person to
attend personally to his entire business. The office of stewardship
arose particularly in large households. Conversely, vicarious action
becomes an exigency when not the cares but the number of men multiply
so as to call for the unity of deliberation and action of the few in the
name of the many. Ambassadorial tasks are as dated as wars and
international relations. The significant element in vicarious agency is
not the action or transaction itself but the mandate or commission
which qualified and authorizes the action. This can be either transient,
an ad koc action, or a permanent office; it may extend generally to all
business or only to certain designated assignments; it may exclude or
confer personal discretionary powers upon the agent within the limits
of the commission; it may represent the interests of a single person or
of a corporate collectivity. It may have a private character (civil) or
it may be public (political).
From the historical experience of vicarious action in the political
domain we may distinguish the representative idea which simply con-
notes vicarious action; the representative principle on which the legiti-
macy of vicarious action rests; the representative system which presents
but does not govern; and the representative governmxnt wherein the
representatives themselves govern, i.e., they legislate, adjudicate, and
execute. Each level of development presupposes authorization, human
or divine, and a mandate. The institutionalized idea gradually descends
from above, the monarch, to the many and becomes ihworporated therein
till it matures into the popular sovereignty of the body politic.
Among primitive peoples 7 before and within the Christian era we
find scarcely any evidence of a vicarious office functioning in the name
17. For studies of primitive practices of representation and Greek and Roman practices
confer: Aristotle's Government of Atheni cc. 63-9 (Atheniensium Respublica) (Kenyon's
transl. 1920); Bonner, Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens (U. of Cal. Press, 1927);
also his, Aspects of Athenian Democracy (U. of Cal. Press, 1933); Bonner and Smith, The
Administration of Justice From Homer to Aristotle (U. of Chi. Press, 1930); Clarke,
Medieval Representation and Consent (London, 1936); De Coulanges, The Ancient City:
A Study of the Religion, Laws, and Institutions of Greece and Rome (1874); Ferguson,
Athenian Juries, 5 Cambridge Ancient History (Cambridge, 1927); Fowler, The City-
State of the Greeks and Romans (London, 1926); Hammond, City-State and World State
in Greek and Roman Political Theory (Boston, 1951); 2 Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical
Jurisprudence: The jurisprudence of the Greek City (London, 1922); 1 Wigmore, Panorama
of the World's Legal Systems (St. Paul, 1928); Heinberg, The History of the Majority
Principle, American Political Science Review (Feb. 1926); Baty, The History of the
Majority Rule, Quarterly Review (Jan. 1912).
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of a corporate association. Primitive communities are tribal, familial,
patriarchal; and the entirety of government consists in the exercise of
a paternal authority within an intricate maze of traditional customs
and immemorial practices. An inviolable sanctity shrouds them and
renders them impervious to change. "Laws" and "government" in our
modern meaning of the terms are non-existent. Age-old usages exact
blind obedience, hold captive the use of direction, and arrest any op-
portunity for prudential initiative. From the moment of birth to
his death, the individual is bounded on all sides by a rigidly fixed
pattern of behavior toward others. Traditions become archaic, frozen
first beginnings-for want of the virtue of progress and the absence of
prudential inventive judgments. Admittedly, consultative conferences
convened from time to time; but these occurred under the stress and
necessities of war and of hunting. The decision proceeded solely from
the elders who speak with supernal authority and irrevocably.
The primitive office of kingship and priesthood suggest vaguely the
representative idea but these in no way embody the representative
principle. The idea itself, an expedient one easily suggested by the
context of human affairs, simply expresses the necessity that one or
more persons stand or act in behalf of others and, at least, for the
purpose at hand, an identity of interests is assumed. Such an idea
applied to private enterprise constitutes a trust. Not till it is transferred
to the public domain, the City, and is enlarged by the consent of the
governed does it become a political principle. In the measure that not
only responsibility for the interests of the group but also as account-
ability to the group increases does the political principle of representa-
tive governance attain institutional maturity.
Ancient Oriental sovereignty was personalized in the royal despot.
Enlightened monarchs would generally surround themselves with sages
and counsellors but the ultimate decision rested solely with the crown.
The practice of consultations was significant for the stress they placed
on the weight of evidence and the prudential advantages of the prevail-
ing counsel of the wise men of the realm. But these consultations are
devoid of any legal force nor do we find a hint of determination by
numerical majority. Practices of popular deliberative assemblies were
not infrequently extant in antiquity. However, we would be mistaken
to read into them the substance of representative democracy. In the
Homeric assemblages, for example, the theory of decision by numerical
majority was in practice thwarted by the restrictions placed upon
free debate. Besides, the unquestioned prerogative of the president
of the assembly to adjudge the numerical force by the tonality of ac-
clamation often disguised the actual manifestation. In the early Teu-
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tonic assemblies, whoever persisted against the decision of the majority
was not held bound by their commitment nor was he thereby considered
an outlaw. It was a customary right of self-assertion. The Athenian
ecclesia regulated itself by an accurate registry of the numerical vote
and the majority decision was definitive and ultimate for all. Ordinarily,
in instances of obvious disparity, the vote was recognized by the show
of hands; in a close contest they took actual count. But if we examine
Athenian representation closely we observe how much it failed to be
a genuine principle of governance. First of all, the Greek City was
too compact and small for the exigencies of representation; second, its
political egalitarianism ill comported with the requisites for the repre-
sentative office, particularly the responsibilities of competence (as Plato
and Aristotle so bitterly complained); third, the absolute discretionary
power of the ecclesia both as to law as well as to fact negated an
essential objective of representation, namely, the supremacy of law
not merely as a juridically self-imposed limitation but also as a direc-
tive force in the prosecution of the public benefit. The Greeks had the
form of pure democracy, that is to say, all the citizens in rotation
directly participated in the office of government. It was for reasons
dictated by daily expedience, social and economic, that a designated
number actually served in public offices. It was not so much on the
principle of representation that some, or rather more accurately, many
(witness the large number in the ecclesia) governed in the name of
popular sovereignty; it was a temporizing convenience. The representa-
tive idea, of action by proxy, was, of course, frequently expressed in
the designation of ambassadorial delegates for the conclusion of treaties
or for the purpose of raising a loan. But there were no permanent
officials or groups who were empowered to act regularly and responsibly
for the City as a whole. The City in a very peculiar sense governed
itself.
The Roman Empire was a monarchically governed commonwealth, a
respublica which had succeeded what the moderns designate as the
Roman Republic and what the Romans of the imperial reign were fond
of calling the Old Republic. In the Vetus Respublica, supreme and
plenary legislative power belonged to the Roman people in their soverign
assemblies. The Senate was invested with auctoritas to serve as a per-
manent council for the chief annual magistrates to consult. It was com-
posed of illustrious Romans and exercised a regulative influence upon
the assemblies for the operation and survival of the Roman Constitution.
This equilibrium of power and harmony of interest collapsed when, in
a series of vehement disputes amongst the Italian people over the spoils
and opportunities of the Empire, the Senate could no longer control
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effectively the action of magistrates who had the right to initiate legisla-
tion in the popular assemblies. It was in such turbulent times that great
military commands were created by the laws of the people for Pompey
and for Caesar. However, the staunch Roman fidelity to tradition endured
through the revolutionary upheavals and restored stability to the Roman
State by grafting monarchy to the Republican Constitution. In the early
imperial age the legislative sovereignty of the Roman people was scarcely
more than a fiction; nonetheless a formal lex populi was still requisite
to confirm the decree by which the Senate invested a new Emperor with
his powers. Thus a later Roman jurist could say that what was in his
time the absolute power of the emperor was the power of the Roman
people, which the people had conferred to its prince. Quod 'principi
placuit, legis vigorem habuit was in ancient and in medieval times cited
in defence of absolutism but in its full context it was also a reminder of
the popular basis of authority. In its entirety, it reads: What has pleased
the prince has the force of law, since by a royal law, enacted concerning
his authority, the people have conceded to and conferred upon him the
whole of their imperium and potestas. And so at least the theory of
ultimate popular consent was maintained.
The great territorial expansion of Rome did not make representa-
tion (in the ordinary political sense of the term) part of the Roman
constitution. The Roman governing class was never effectively subjected
to the pressure of the external provinces as to induce it to replace the
popular assemblies and the Senate of the Old Roman city-state by an
all-inclusive body of representatives elected by the outlying communities
of the Italian peninsula much less of all peoples of the imperial conquest.
Besides, the Roman conception of the imperium would never admit of
actual constitutional definition in the modern sense of a publicly self-
imposed, i.e., legal, limit to power. Roman constitutionalism consisted
in the distribution and legitimate delegation of power; never in its
limitation. It was absolute as well as plenary. Roman power, like the
Roman arch, was justified in the equilibrium it maintained and sup-
ported. Its constitutionalism was simply the political description of its
actual governance, viz., the constitutio rei. Roman representation was
accordingly scarcely more than public service; surely, not a juridic
institution for the insurance of a defined public law and its empowerments.
ROMAN PRIVATE LAW AND CANON LAW
Roman public law provided neither constitutionalism in the modern
use of the term nor representative governance. Roman private law, i.e.,
civil law, did provide certain ingredients of stable trusteeship which
the rulers of the Christian era, lay and ecclesiastical, were to expand into
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a principle for representative government. From private and proprietory,
it would be transferred and made applicable to the public, corporate and,
therefore, political domain. We will endeavor to ascertain the measure
of this indebtedness and the extent of the Christian interpolation of the
original meaning and intent.
The legists and decretalists of the thirteenth century found in the
Digest and the Justinian Code premises and precedents for vicarious
responsible agency. This rested directly upon authorization, plena
potestas agendi, and the commission, inandatumii , which enabled the
proctor to act as if the principal or his constituent himself were present
and, unless otherwise restricted by the necessity of referendum or by
special limited trust, to act in all eventualities in the capacity of a
steward in transactions with a legal import. Plena potestas and mnanda-
turn are clearly two distinct empowerments. The prior is the extent of
the authorization that qualifies an action as responsibly vicarious, the
latter is the commission to be transacted. Nonetheless, because the two
frequently appeared conjointly one may easily and inaccurately see
simply a tautology for the purpose of reinforced emphasis or in the
commission of a general mandate, a seemingly blank equivalence. This
misconception was scarcely possible with a special mandate which was
restricted to a particular business to be transacted on a designated date
with the ad hoc consent of the constituent to a special proctor. The
general mandate was a comprehensive commission which empowered the
agent to attend to a collectivity of suits or to act in all suits with the
reservation that he must refer back to his principal and obtain added
instructions or further approval in such instances as might operate to
the latter's damage or loss. However, if plena potestas or its customary
equivalent, libera administratio, were annexed to the general mandate,
the representative agent could attend to all business of his domrinus
relieved of any restriction and act as if the principal were present in
person. In this latter instance we have the fullest expression of real
representation; for the responsibility of discretionary judgment and of
action devolves upon a stable office of the agent and the resultant conse-
quences bind the principal as effectively as if he had acted directly.
These legal significances were common to the Roman private practices
in civilian suits and reappear in the thirteenth century revival of Roman
law among the civilian legists and the ecclesiastical canonists both in
their theory and in their actual practices.
The earliest Christian use of the Roman proctorial mandate was a
continuance of the Roman practice for representation in courts and in
ordinary business transactions. Gradually with the revival of Roman
Law in the thirteenth century in Italy the imperial and papal chanceries
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adopted it to express the commissions entrusted to ambassadors who at
times functioned as plenipotentiaries and at other times more like
proctors in a litigation. This differentiation derived from the matter to
be transacted-be it the establishment of peace or the vindication and
restoration of a right or claim. Ambassadorial offices were also availed
of by princes and cities to negotiate truces, treaties, and other contractual
agreements, and even extended to cover the duties of royal procurators
and papal legates as administrators.
"For almost every kind of agency and representation, therefore, the Roman
formulas were in daily use by the middle of the thirteenth century. Plena potestas
gave the agent carte blanche, within the limits set by the principal's welfare and
knowledge of the issue, to conclude the business; and his conclusion of it had
the consent of his constituent. This consent, however, was given in the terms of
the mandate before the negotiation started."18
Summarily then, an early and important usage of plena potestas was in
the mandatwm given to nuntii or procuratores as ambassadors of princes
and cities. In pre-Christian Roman law and later among the glossators
of the thirteenth century revival, any kind of pactum or conventio was
a contract between two or more consenting parties, who could be repre-
sented by agents. One kind of conventio was a public one, namely,
treaties of peace, alliances, which like private contracts could be trans-
acted by proctors. Proctorial commissions, in conclusion, were either
private or of public character, either of personal or corporate representa-
tion. If the affair was between equals (e.g., kings) or between autono-
mous communes and princes, the agents were ambassadors. But if it
was between ruler and subjects or subject communities, the agents of
the latter were proctors representing their constituents before a superior
authority. The mandatum could be either general or specific and the
potestas either partial or plenary.
How this Roman-Canonical process contributed to the evolution and
development of representative government in secular and ecclesiastical
assemblies and, secondly, the measure in which the civil commonwealth
was influenced toward this political maturity by its immediacy with
the Church and Her religious Orders, will constitute the major design
of the remaining portion of this treatise. Until now we have seen how
responsible representative agency was at its best fulfilled in the proc-
torial mandate of Roman private law and in the public domain both in
Roman and early Christian period restricted to representative trans-
actions between distinct empowerments or associations alien to each other
ad extra i.e., to foreign affairs. We have yet to see how from these
usages the representative, responsible agency will evolve within (ad intra)
the same associative community, ecclesiastical and secular.
18. Post, Plena Potestas and Consent in Medieval Assemblies, 1 Traditio 368 (1943).
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REPRESENTATION IN CHRISTENDOM
The constant repetition of the obvious has not dulled the impact of
the significance of the interpenetration of the Catholic Church in the
temporalities of medieval history. Invested with the divine mission for
the salvation of souls and for the propagation of the Faith, She strove
with the zeal of saints and with the supernal power of the sacraments to
achieve the kingdom of God without as well as within the souls of men.
Christian lives spelt out a Christian society and it was the Catholic Faith
which gave coherence as well as cohesion to Western Christendom. Civili-
zation was Catholic and Catholicism was civilization. As depositor of
the Divine Faith which recognized no restricted area of human activity
and endeavor, there was nothing beyond her theology. Art, education,
literature, philosophy, and science glowed with a divine intention. For
centuries the Catholic Church gave to Western Europe a culture common
to royal courts, to universities, and to monasteries. Divine in its estab-
lishment, the Catholic Church was the most tangible temporal institution
in existence, and its immersion in private lives and public offices was but
a historic response to St. Paul's Civis Romanus sum.
The study of the institutional development of the Middle Ages is
an organic whole in which leadership by example and promotion must
be ascribed to the Church. Institutionally the Church was the most
advanced organization in existence and from Her radiated the all-
pervading influence for order. Centralized in the Vatican at Rome, with
a magnificent civil service and obedient emissary in every village, the
Church strove through sacerdotium and regnum to consolidate the hetero-
geneous and anarchical elements that succeeded the downfall of the
Roman Empire by the bond of Christian unity that transcends the divi-
sions of barbarian and Roman and by a moral tie that is superior to armed
force; by softening slavery into serfdom, and preparing the way for the
ultimate enfranchisement of the human person in the civil and political
order.
The Catholic Church was bound intimately with medieval society. In
the feudal hierarchical structure minor and major prelates held fiefs of
kings and were invested with grave seignorial responsibilities. They
served as royal counsellors and conjointly with lay barons and tenants-
in-chief comprised the curia regis and magnum councilium. It is not to
be wondered that Canon Law helped formulate custom and common law
in accordance with reason and equity. Moreover, the clergy were in-
volved in the taxes that were levied and their uncompromising position
of no taxation without consent (at the instance of Rome) contributed
largely to the corresponding claims of the laity. As the most solvent
class in medieval society, the clerics were frequently called upon for
1954]
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what was euphemistically called "gracious aids"; but such a polite label
did cover a sound basis in virtue of which a financial "take" without
legal warrant or consent was to be sharply called a "cut," a maltote.
Laymen and ecclesiastics were often involved in the same problems and
actions, and the practice of episcopal and baronial opposition was no
brief experiment limited to a regency or a minority. But still more
pertinently, the creative political thought of the Middle Ages was almost
wholly clerical and from the atmosphere of her thought evolved that
constitutionalism which Bracton so aptly epitomized, lex te fecit regem.
The Magna Charta, the Song of Lewes, and the Bractonian dicta mark
the doctrinal groping toward institutional guarantees of the constitu-
tionalism of the Carolingian capitularia. This it sought to achieve by
the king's dependence upon the counsel and consent of the "governed."
The historic process and the influences under which this development
was promoted through the representative system is the central argument
of this paper. We attribute it to distinctly Catholic principles and
practices, ecclesiastical and laical.
The doctrinal influence and practical contributions of the Catholic
Church to the promotion and evolution of the representative system
looms larger with every additional scientific research. The extremely
valuable works of Ernest Barker, Holdsworth, F. M. Powicke, Dr. Lunt,
and Maude V. Clarke have brought to light significant materials on the
ecclesiastical avenue to the history of the English Parliament. Their
works, however, have been confined either to the general question of
early representation or to particular problems of clerical taxation.
Research has not yet extended to the frontier lines where lay and ecclesi-
astical activity meet. Scarcely more than cursory notice has been taken,
for example, of Edward's relations with the clergy and the Pope. In
this study, we narrow our study to the Christian conversion of the
Roman proctorial mandate of private law into the enlarged principle
of corporate representation as exemplified in ecclesiastical practices,
oecumenical, religious, and synodal, and through their vogue and influ-
ence, in the evolution of the English Parliament.
From the earliest days of the Church, beginning in fact, with the
Council of Jerusalem, 9 recorded in the Acts of the Apostles, ecclesiasti-
cal convocations were summoned for the supervision and custody of
the faith of Her members. Consultative arrangements from the lowest
to the highest regional units helped integrate into organizational union
the fast expanding boundaries of Her apostolic fruitfulness. Diocesan
synods, summoned by bishops, metropolitan convocation of provincial
bishops, national congregations and oecumenical councils regulated, by
19. Acts of the Apostles c. xv., vv. 1-29.
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a hierarchy of obediences, the unity of the Church under the papal
supremacy.
The organic unity adumbrating in theory two distinct, albeit in
practice rather vaguely divided, jurisdictions or governments, the regnum
and sacerdotium, uniquely constituting the historic phenomenon of
Christendom, the respublica cristiana, and the interdependent coopera-
tion and mutually complementary activity of ecclesiastics and laymen,
would obviously suggest the inclusion of royal powers at the larger
assemblies. Let us note here that these synods were representative
only in a very rudimentary and imperfect sense. The summons was
personal and not to a corporate group; the transactions of the synods
were at most consultative and never infringed upon the spiritual
authority of the bishop, much less of the Pope; Christian peace and
justice, the propagation of the Faith, and the custody of the moral
discipline in high and low places were the general objectives of their
deliberations. The representative idea differed essentially in the episcopal
and temporal empowerments. Amongst the laity, this idea was expressed
in the symbolic personification of the community in the figure of the
ruler and as their viceregent he appeared as their vicar. Amongst the
ecclesiastics, the bishops represented their diocese by reason of their
sacred office as vicars of Christ and accordingly were endowed with
powers from above without contingency upon a popular mandate.
In the thirteenth century the Church gave a great impetus to the insti-
tutional development of representation. Three oecumenical Councils
convened in that century. The Fourth Lateran Council was summoned
by Innocent III in 1215; the First Council of Lyons assembled by
Innocent IV in 1245; and the Second Council of Lyons was convoked by
Gregory X in 1274. The Fourth Lateran Council put the representative
principle into operation on a scale with a prestige which made it known
throughout the whole of western Europe. Not only archbishops and
bishops, but abbots and priors and all the monarchs of Western Christen-
dom were cited to appear. Many others were represented by proctors.
The proctor representing an individual was not an innovation, but a
novel addition to counciliar convocations occurred when Innocent In
requested the bishops to enjoin the chapters of the churches, not only
cathedral but others as well, to designate of their own accord a provost
or dean or some other suitable men to act on behalf of the whole body.
He gave as his reason for this new departure that business relating to
chapters would be brought before the whole council, and on that basis,
actual and not merely virtual, representation was required. Thus, for
the first time in an oecumenical council representatives of the community
of chapters are present. We are yet far from representation of the
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community of the diocese. This was to be the unique English achieve-
ment and, we think, in likely imitation of the Dominican Convocation
which included in its composition proctors of local chapters. The reason
given by Innocent III for this inclusion is significant because it will
prove to be the motor argument for the gradual extension and increasing
power of the representative system in the secular order, namely, the
exaction of money. It was part of the Pope's design of reform to compel
the chapters to allot one prebend for the support of a school-master and,
in commanding attendance of their representatives, he was acting on
the principle already expressed in his canons-quod omnes tangit, ab
omnibus approbetur.2 ° This was a maxim embedded in the private law
of Rome"' and the Church had transferred its applic ation to the public
domain. It had appeared early in the legislation of the ninth century-
the Edictum Pistensel2 and again in the legal work of Edward I of
England in the thirteenth century. The principle gradually became the
basis for majority decision, as it was explained and developed by the
canonists in the light of a fundamentally rational principle, the sanior et
maior pars, which was first used by Pope Alexander III in the twelfth
century. The underlying reason justifying this procedure was given by
Innocent IV in the thirteenth century, quia per plures melius veritas
inquiritur. In this wise, a Roman law maxim, which the ancients used
only in the guardianship of private property was applied by the Church
to the public domain of corporate groups.
But we are yet far from this mature achievement. We must not think
that the papal premises worked with the inevitable logic of abstract
thought. But when the immediacy of responsibility and the sensitive
motives of sound self-interest (such as possessions) touch upon human
conduct, recourse is had to first principles as the basis of justification
of a title in a conflict of claims, be it moral, legal, or political. The two
oecumenical Councils at Lyons in 1245 and 1274 were summoned by
Innocent IV and Gregory IX respectively by the same procedure and
representatives are requested from chapters of churches, both cathedral
and others. The great significance of the Fourth Lateran Council is
equally highlighted by two canons which served to generalize the idea
and process of representation by enjoining it upon all religious orders
and reviving the traditional synodal activity which by the end of the
twelfth century had become almost extinct amongst the provincials. The
sixth canon enforced an old canonical custom which enjoined annual
20. Barker, Dominican Order and Convocation 32 (1913), citing Labbe and Cossart,
Concilia, XI, I, 124.
21. Justinian, Code V, Tit. 59, 5, cap. 3.
22. Monumenta Germaniae Historica, Karoli II Edictum Pistense 490.
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meeting of provincial and diocesan synods for purposes of legislation; the
twelfth canon ordered triennial chapters in each national province by
those religious orders by whom the practice had not already been
adopted. Henceforth, the composition of provincial synods are no longer
restricted to bishops and abbots; it is enlarged by the insertion of the
cathedral clergy and then-but only in England-by the inclusion of
the diocesan clergy. In France the provincial organization developed
further than elsewhere on the Continent; but it never descended below
the representation of the cathedral clergy. When, in the beginning of
the fourteenth century, royal letters requested the chapters to send
proctorial representatives to the States General the parochial clergy were
not summoned either in person or through proctors. They possessed
neither temporalities nor jurisdiction. The chapters, collective seignories
as well as collective prelacies, attend the States General as the provincial
synod; the ordinary clergy participate in neither.
Scarcely ten years after the Lateran Council, evidence of an irreversible
process of development is manifest at the legatine Council Bourges in
1225. At this Council, the legate put forth the papal request for prebends
in all the conventual churches. When he gave the proctors present
leave to depart, retaining only bishops and abbots, the proctors protested
with a fixed determination that attests to the clarity and strength of
the Leonine precedent. Since this business touches the chapters, the
legate should have submitted the papal proposal to them in presentia;
and they admonished him in the words of Innocent III as they were
especially concerned, and if some consented, they would not be bound
unless what concerned all was determined with all in common. Their
arguments illustrated the gathering strength and advance made by the
papal conjunction of the principle of consent with that of representa-
tion in matters touching upon persons and property. Historically, this
Council of Bourges is noteworthy. It is the first instance after the
Lateran Council to use proctors and, in turn, it served as the model for
the English assembly summoned by Archbishop Langton, the following
year, 1226, to answer the same papal demand. Langton was copying the
procedure and principle used at the Fourth Lateran Council and at
Bourges. In England too this was the first ecclesiastical assembly to
which proctors came with a mandate from their electors. The English
clerics refused the papal demand in language literally copied from that
given at Bourges the year before, just as Archbishop Langton had copied
the summons of proctors to the Lateran Council and to the legatine
Council of 1225. The historical process is unmistakable. The signifi-
cance of the composition and proceeding of the representative assembly
which Langton convened at London on May 2, 1226, is underscored by
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the fact that it was consequent to the one in which the canons of
Salisbury earlier that summer had refused to agree to a subsidy until
the proctors of chapters had been similarly summoned.
In the subsequent" and concluding part of this study we will observe
how the papal instructions and counciliar precedents in the conjunction
of the principle of consent and the principle of representation in the
limited matter of proprietary interests and especially the sixth and
twelfth canons of the Fourth Lateran Council which enjoined the
universal practice of representative assemblies amongst the metropolitans
and the religious orders will take root with peculiar felicitous providence
in England. Consequent to the arrival of the Dominican Friars in
England in 1221, a gradual expansion of representation in the English
provincial synod develops till it ultimately comprises the proctors of
diocesan clergy. Concurrently with this latter development, a parallel
expansion takes place in the political domain and with similar motiva-
tions and on the basis of identical principles. Therein we will measure in
general dimensions the historic environmental influence of the Dominican
Friars and of the English Synodal Convocations upon the gradual
development of the national parliament.
23. To be continued and completed in the December 1954 issue.
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